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I.

INTRODUCTION

Labor arbitration has been a fixture of unionized workplaces for over half a century.
Ubiquitous in contemporary collective bargaining agreements, labor arbitration enjoys wide
acceptance by a variety of stakeholders – including unions, firms, academics, and public policy
advocates. Employment arbitration has rapidly expanded since its inception in the 1990s.
Today, scholars estimate over half of all nonunion private sector workers are subject to a
mandatory employment arbitration clauses.1 Unlike labor arbitration, adhesive employment
arbitration remains a provocative institution.2 To date, researchers, advocates and policy-makers
have focused mainly on the outcomes within arbitration, analyzing the rates of employee plaintiffs
win and the size of their monetary awards.3 However, basic institutional characteristics of
employment neutrals have been underexplored. This project seeks to continue the work of Colvin
& Gough (2016) and Seeber & Lipsky (2004) by moving beyond an analysis of win rates and
award amounts and describing the backgrounds and professional practices of employment neutrals
and comparing these to the backgrounds and professional practices of labor neutrals.4 This study
advances the field by shining a light on the emergent, but underexplored, employment neutral
profession and progressing our understanding of the evolving dispute resolution environment.
I further delve into labor and employment neutral practitioner views on debates
surrounding employment arbitration. Scholars have identified a potentially alarming statistical
relationship where employers who appear before an arbitrator multiple times experience more
favorable outcomes relative to appearing before an arbitrator only one time.5 This so-called repeat
player effect has received substantial academic interest. However, it is a severe oversight that
workplace neutrals themselves have not been given a voice in the contentious discussion over
1

See Mark Gough, Employment Lawyers and Mandatory Arbitration: Facilitating or Forestalling Access to
Justice? Advances in Industrial and Labors Relations in Managing and Resolving Conflict, 105-134 (2016).
Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration. (2017), https://www.epi.org/publication/thegrowing-use-of-mandatory-arbitration/.
2

See Mark, D Gough, How Do Organizational Environments and Mandatory Arbitration Shape Employment
Attorney Case Selection? Evidence from and Experimental Vignette. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: A JOURNAL OF
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, 541-567, (2018);Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration:
Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury? EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL 345-364, (2007);
Estreicher et. al. , Evaluating Employment Arbitration: A Call for Better Empirical Research 70 Rutgers University
Law Review 375 (2018); Cynthia Estlund, i, 96 N.C. L. Rev. 679 (2018); Sam Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws, 16
Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 559-570 (2001)
3

See e.g. Colvin,. An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes. 8 JOURNAL OF
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 1-23; see also Gough, Tale of Two Forums: Employment Discrimination Outcomes in
Litigation and Arbitration INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW (2020); Mark D. Gough, The High Costs of
an Inexpensive Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Claims Heard in Arbitration and Civil
Litigation, 35 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW 91-112, (2014).
4

Gough, supra note 1, at 105-134; Seeber, et al., The Ascendancy of Employment Arbitrators in U.S. Employment
Relations: A New Actor in the American System?, 44 BRITISH JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 719-756, (2004)
5

See generally, Colvin, supra note 2 at345-364; Alexander Colvin,. An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration:
Case Outcomes and Processes 8 JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES, 1-23, (2011).
Alexander J.S. Colvin, and Mark Gough, Individual Employment Rights Arbitration in the United States: Actors and
Outcomes,68 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 1019-1042.
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repeat player effects identified in the academic literature and other debates implicating due process
in employment arbitration. This study seeks to expand on the existing empirical literature by
reporting how neutrals themselves view some of the most provocative contemporary debates
surrounding employment arbitration.
To illuminate the contours of the labor and employment neutral profession I gathered data
on the following aspects: professional background and work histories, other work activities of parttime neutrals, and characteristics of their current professional neutral practices along with neutral
perceptions of the fairness of employment arbitration.
After a description of the methods to generate the report in the proceeding section, the results are
presented as follows: (1) Neutral Practice Types; (2) Neutral Demographics; (3) Neutral Practice
Characteristics; and (4) Neutral Views on Employment Arbitration.
II.

METHODS

In this study, I investigate the professional characteristics, networks, and perceptions of
labor and employment arbitrators by surveying professional neutrals. The survey frame consisted
of active employment arbitrators from the (i) American Arbitration Association (AAA) and (ii)
JAMS compiled from the agencies’ case reports and (iii) labor arbitrators from the National
Academy of Arbitrator (NAA) member roster. JAMS and AAA are the largest arbitration providers
in the U.S. and are jointly responsible for administering a majority— approximately 70% — of all
employment arbitrations in the country.6 Pursuant to state law, arbitration providers are required
to report key information on all mandatory consumer arbitration conducted, including arbitrator
names. 7 I were able to produce the universe of practicing AAA and JAMS employment arbitrators
from these disclosures. Also included in the survey frame are NAA members, allowing us to assess
the current state of neutral practice among the Academy’s membership, as well as being able to
identify differences between types of neutral practices. In total, our survey sampling frame (i.e.
the list of names I sent our survey to) consisted of 1,243 unique arbitrators.
I administered the survey questionnaire during Summer of 2018 using a combined webbased and physical mailing method. For the web-based administration, arbitrators received an
initial email requesting their participation with a link to the web-based survey instrument, as well
as two follow-up reminders. I then mailed paper copies of the survey to non-respondents to solicit
additional participation. This combination of web-based and traditional hard-copy mailing yielded
612 useable responses from practicing arbitrators, representing a response rate of 49 percent.
However, among NAA members, our response rate approached 80 percent.

A recent survey of employment plaintiffs’ lawyers based on 1,258 responses, found that the American Arbitration
Association was the administering organization in 50% of attorney respondents’ most recent arbitration case and
JAMS was named as the arbitration provider in 20% of cases. The remaining arbitrations were conducted Ad Hoc
(i.e., no arbitration provider was used) or used a variety of smaller and local arbitration provider agencies.
6

7

For a detailed discussion of relevant state laws and the consumer arbitration report requirement, see Colvin, supra
note 2.
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III.

RESULTS
A. Neutral Types
1. Neutral Practice Type

In the results that follow, I break down our statistics into separate categories of responses
from exclusive labor neutral practitioners, exclusive employment neutral practitioners, and “multineutrals” who practice both labor and employment neutral work. Doing so allows us to identify
ways in which the emerging employment arbitration profession is similar to or different from the
more well-established labor arbitration profession as embodied in its leading professional
organization, the NAA.
Table 1 shows the distribution of practice type among respondents. Approximately 32
percent of respondents indicated their neutral practices in the previous year focused exclusively
on arbitration and/or mediation of union-management disputes. I label such respondents “Labor
Neutrals.” All labor neutrals in our sample, or 100 percent, are members of the National Academy
of Arbitrators. Nearly a quarter of respondents, or 21 percent, indicated their neutral practices in
the previous year consisted exclusively of non-union employment arbitration and/or non-union
employment mediation. I label such respondents as “Employment Neutrals.” No employment
neutral is a member of the NAA in our sample. Finally, the largest group of respondents,
comprising almost half, or 47 percent of our sample, consist of neutrals who have engaged in both
labor arbitration and/or mediation and nonunion employment arbitration and/or mediation within
the previous year. I refer to these respondents as “Multi-neutrals.” Approximately three quarters,
or 79 percent, of multi-neutrals are members of the NAA.

Table 1: Responses, by Practice Type
Practice Type
No.
%
Labor Neutral
195
32
Employment Neutral
129
21
Multi-neutral
288
47
Total
612
100
B. Neutral Demographics
2. Demographics
I begin by looking at the demographics of the labor and employment neutral profession.
Table 2 reports demographic characteristics of survey respondents by practice type. One of the
long-standing concerns in the arbitration profession is a lack of demographic diversity among
arbitrators which is apparent in Table 2 across all neutral types. Indeed, labor and employment
neutrals are homogeneous in terms of race and gender. Women comprise approximately one-fifth
of neutrals across all practitioner types; only 17 percent of labor neutral, 20 percent of employment
neutral, and 21 percent of multi-neutral respondents indicated they were female. The proportion
of racial minorities within each practitioner type is even more lopsided; a mere 5 percent of labor
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neutral, 4 percent of employment neutral, and 5 percent of multi-neutral respondents identified as
racial minorities. That females and racial minorities are starkly underrepresented within the
arbitration profession is not a novel finding; however, these trends deserve continued concern.

Table 2: Demographic Distributions, by Practice Type
Labor
Employment
MultiNeutral (%) Neutral (%) neutral (%)
Gender
Female
17
20
21
Male
83
80
79
Race
White, Non-Hispanic
Non-White

95
5

96
4

95
5

Age
40 to 49
50 to 59
60 to 69
70 to 79
80 to 89
90 or over

2
4
22
47
21
1

4
6
43
39
9
0

3
7
36
48
6
0

Education
JD
PhD

54
24

100
2

89
9

Location
Northeast
Southeast
Midwest
Southwest
West
Canada
No.

49
25
37
17
19
7
195

25
19
25
30
26
0
129

38
27
35
23
30
7
288

The distribution of ages among practice types is further explored in Table 2. Only 6 percent of
labor neutrals are under the age of 60 while almost one-quarter of all labor respondents, or 22
percent, are over the age of 80. The largest cohort of labor neutrals is represented in the 70 to 79
age range. Employment neutrals, as a demographic, are slightly younger than their labor neutral
peers. Specifically, 10 percent of employment neutrals are under the age of 60, only 9 percent are
over the age of 80, and the largest age demographic, representing 43 percent of respondents, is
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those between the ages of 60 and 69. Multi-neutrals resemble employment neutrals on the tail
ends of the age distribution but also resemble labor neutrals in that the largest age demographic,
representing 48 percent of multi-neutral respondents, is those between 70 and 79. Arbitrators,
and particularly those who practice labor arbitration exclusively, are an aging cohort working
well into the typical retirement years found in the rest of the U.S. workforce.
The vast majority of arbitrators hold advanced degrees, either J.D.’s or Ph.D.’s. Table 2
shows 54 percent of labor neutrals hold a J.D. compared to 100 percent of employment neutrals
and 89 percent of multi-neutrals. Nearly a quarter, or 24 percent, of labor neutrals obtained a Ph.D.
while only 2 percent and 9 percent of employment neutrals and multi-neutrals hold a Ph.D.,
respectively. Educational background is one area where there is a clear difference between those
who practice non-union employment arbitration and/or mediation and those who focus exclusively
on union-management disputes. This is not particularly surprising as the skill sets, customer
preferences, and cases heard in non-union employment arbitration increase the importance of
formal legal training relative to labor arbitration where procedures and disputes can be less formal
and legalistic.
I asked respondents “[i]n what region(s) do you practice as a neutral?” and report the results
in Table 2. As respondents could select multiple regions, each column does not sum to 100. Almost
half, 49 percent, of labor arbitrators reported practicing in the Northeast and over one-third, or 37
percent, practice in the Midwest, though only one-fifth, or 19 percent, practiced in the West. Multineutrals practices are concentrated in the Northeast, at 38 percent, the Midwest, 35 percent, and
the West, 30 percent. Unionization rates are highest in the Northeast, Midwest, and West, so one
would expect labor arbitrators to practice at higher rates in the West as well. But this is not the
case. This data does not necessarily show that there is less labor arbitration occurring in the
Western U.S.; rather, it may suggest that multi-neutrals are conducting labor arbitration at higher
rates in the West. Employment Neutrals are more evenly dispersed through the U.S. and practice
in the Southwest (30 percent), West (26 percent), Midwest (25 percent), Northeast (25 percent),
and Southeast (19 percent). One notable relationship is that areas with a higher concentration of
labor arbitration practices report lower concentrations of employment arbitration practice. While
labor arbitrators are most likely to report practicing in the Northeast, Midwest, and the Southwest,
employment arbitrators are least likely to report working in these same geographic areas. This may
indicate the labor and employment arbitration are substitutes rather than complementary
institutional practices.
3. Neutral Work Histories
Table 3a: Rates of Work Experience, by Practice Type
Labor Neutral
(%)
Work History (Occupation)
Law (Defense/Employer)
15
Law (Employee/Union)
13
Law (Other)
14
Academic
45
Government
37
Management
16
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Employment
Neutral (%)

Multi-neutral
(%)

50
20
57
24
35
2

36
32
37
37
31
13

Union

11

-

9

Labor Neutral
(years)

Employment
Neutral (years)

Multi-neutral
(years)

15
9
21
26
13
11
9

16
16
19
9
12
15
-

20
16
18
23
9
9
7

Table 3b: Mean Work Experience, by Practice Type

Work History (Occupation)
Law (Defense/Employer)
Law (Employee/Union)
Law (Other)
Academic
Government
Management
Union

What types of work have neutrals pursued over the course of their careers? Table 3a shows
prior careers of labor neutrals, employment neutrals, and multi-neutrals. I asked respondents to
indicate all previous job episodes, therefore, neutrals could select multiple prior careers, i.e. the
categories sum to over 100 percent.
Differences between labor arbitrators, employment arbitrators, and multi-neutrals can
again be observed in Table 3a and Table 3b. Labor arbitrators are almost twice as likely to have
worked in academia and substantially less likely to have worked in law relative to employment
neutrals. Labor arbitrators are most likely to have had some experience in academia and
government service. Specially, 45 percent of labor arbitrators report having worked in academic
employment and 37 percent report having worked in government service. Those labor arbitrators
with work experience in academia have, on average, 26 years of experience, and those labor
arbitrators with work experience in government have spent, on average, 13 years in government
service. Employment neutrals are most likely to report experience in Law (Other) (57 percent) and
practicing as a defense-side lawyer (50 percent). It is notable that not a single employment neutral
respondent reported having experience working for a union compared to 11 percent for labor
neutrals and 9 percent for multi-neutrals. Though only 2 percent of employment neutrals report
having experience working in management compared to 16 percent of labor neutrals and 13 percent
of multi-neutrals. Multi-neutrals, by some measures, have the most diverse work histories, with
nearly one-third of multi-neutral respondents indicating experience practicing in each of the
following areas: defense-side law, employee- or union-side law, in other areas of the law, in
academia, and government.
Taken together, Tables 1 through 3 present a complex picture of labor, employment, and
multi-neutrals. Regardless of practice type, neutrals are uniformly homogeneous in terms of race
and gender. However, important distinctions are present between practice types in terms of
education, geographic practice area, and work histories. One striking pattern that emerges is that
multi-neutrals appear equally similar—and dissimilar—to both labor and employment neutrals.
Rather than resembling either labor or employment neutrals, multi-neutral characteristics have
their own distinct characteristics.
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C. Neutral Practice Characteristics
4. Part-Time Status
What do the professional practices of neutrals look like? As an initial point of entry, our
results indicate labor and multi-neutrals are nearly twice as likely to describe themselves as fulltime relative to employment neutrals.

Table 4: Part-Time Status, by Practice Type
Labor
Employment
MultiPart-Time Status
Neutral (%) Neutral (%) neutral (%)
Part-Time
39
69
31
Full-Time
61
31
69
No.
195
129
288
As seen in Table 4, a majority, 61 percent, of labor neutrals, just under one-third, 31
percent, of employment neutrals, and over two-thirds, or 69 percent of multi-neutrals consider
themselves full-time neutrals. Table 5 further compares part-time and full-time neutrals by
presenting sources of income by full-time status and practice type.
5. Sources of Income

The percentage of income attributed to neutral work is consistent with neutrals’ part-time
status, on average. Full-time neutrals across practice types derive nearly all of their income from
neutral work, on average. A majority of part-time labor neutral and multi-neutral income derives
from their neutral work; however, only one-third of part-time employment neutral income is
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attributed to their work in employment arbitration and mediation while over half of their income,
58 percent, is earned in legal practice. Table 5 suggests that part-time neutrals across practice
types are not all part-time workers; rather, part-time neutral work appears to complement outside
careers for many. This is further explored in Table 6 below.
6. Alternative Occupations
What other work do part-time neutrals pursue? Table 6 shows that among part-time labor
neutrals, almost half, 48 percent, have no other occupation, 25 percent are occupied as academics
in addition to their part-time arbitration practices and 24 percent practice law outside the scope of
labor and employment law. The large proportion of part-time labor neutrals who do not pursue
additional remuneration outside their neutral work may be explained by the relatively older
population of labor neutrals. By contrast, over half of the employment neutrals who are part-time
are practicing attorneys in their other work. Specifically, among employment neutrals, 40 percent
practice defense- or employer-side law, 16 percent practice plaintiff- or employee-side law, and
nearly half, 50 percent practice in other areas of the law. Fourteen percent of multi-neutrals practice
defense- or employer-side law, only 8 percent practice plaintiff- or employee-side law and 36
percent indicate practicing in other areas of the law on a part-time basis. While institutional norms
and formal rules prevent labor neutrals from actively practicing labor and employment law, it is
noteworthy that employment and multi-neutrals are approximately twice as likely to represent
employers than they are employees yet report working for unions at approximately four times the
rate they work as managers.

Table 6: Alternative Occupations of Part-Time Neutrals, by Practice Type
Labor
Employment
MultiNeutral (%) Neutral (%) neutral (%)
Occupation (Part-Time)
Law (Defense/Employer)
0
40
14
Law (Employee/Union)
0
16
8
Law (Other)
24
50
36
Academic
25
4
22
Government
3
5
2
Management
3
5
2
Union
0
16
10
None
48
15
20
No.
76
89
90
Note: Full-time nuetral responses not included. Rows can sum to greater than
100 as multiple occupations can be selected.
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7. Neutral Caseloads
What do neutral practices look like across the professions? Our results indicate clear
differences among labor neutrals, employment neutrals and multi-neutrals. Specifically, Table 7
shows that almost the entirety, or 86 percent, of labor neutral practices are comprised of labor
arbitration cases with approximately 10 percent of their neutral caseload attributed to labor
mediation and other neutral work. A plurality, or 39 percent, of employment neutral practices are
comprised of employment arbitration cases, but 29 percent of their neutral caseload consists of
employment mediation. Multi-neutral practices are concentrated around labor arbitration, which
represents 60 percent of their neutral caseload, but approximately one-quarter, or 26 percent, of
their neutral caseload comprises employment mediation or arbitration.

Table 7: Distribution of Case Types, by Practice Type
Labor
Employment
MultiNeutral (%) Neutral (%) neutral (%)
Type of Neutral Work
Employment Arbitration
-39
14
Employment Mediation
-29
12
Labor Arbitration
86
-60
Labor Mediation
9
-5
Other Nuetral Work
1
23
8
Note: Values do not sum to 100 but represent responses as recorded
There is significant variation in the labor arbitration, labor mediation, employment
arbitration, and employment mediation caseloads among neutrals. Table 8 shows yearly caseload
distributions by practice type. The average number of labor arbitration cases presided over by labor
neutrals is 55 cases per year. However, a substantial minority of labor arbitrators, 20 percent,
presided over less than 10 labor arbitration cases last year and 13 percent presided over 100 or
more labor arbitration cases last year. The highest labor arbitration caseload reported by a labor
neutral was 360 cases per year. In addition to arbitration cases, labor neutrals, on average, presided
over 6 labor mediation cases per year. While the majority, 66 percent, of labor neutrals mediated
less than 10 labor disputes (and exactly one-third did not mediate any labor cases), nearly onethird, or 34 percent, mediated between 10 and 24 labor disputes. The highest labor mediation
caseload reported by labor neutrals was 24 cases per year. As with sources of income, arbitration,
not mediation, comprises the majority of labor neutral caseloads.
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Table 8: Distribution of Yearly Caseloads, by Practice and Case Type
Labor Neutrals
Labor
Labor
Employment Employment
Arbitration Mediation
Arbitration
Mediation
0-9
10-24
25-49
50-99
100+
Population Mean (# of cases)
Employment Neutrals
0-9
10-24
25-49
50-99
100+
Population Mean (# of cases)
Multi-neutrals
0-9
10-24
25-49
50-99
100+
Population Mean (# of cases)

20%
16%
25%
27%
13%
55

66%
34%
---6

Labor
Arbitration
------

Labor
Mediation
------

Employment Employment
Arbitration
Mediation
27%
6%
61%
50%
8%
17%
5%
21%
-6%
17
24

Labor
Arbitration
7%
20%
31%
24%
14%
52

Labor
Mediation
45%
29%
17%
3%
6%
20

Employment Employment
Arbitration
Mediation
37%
44%
50%
28%
9%
13%
3%
6%
-9%
15
27

------

------

Table 8 further shows that employment neutrals arbitrate 17 cases per year and mediate 24
cases per year, on average. The lower overall caseload is consistent with the higher rates of parttime neutrals within employment neutrals. Here again, however, the average caseload masks
substantial variation within the caseloads of employment neutrals. Specifically, the majority, 61
percent, of employment neutrals preside over 10 to 24 employment arbitration cases per year, but
27 percent preside over less than 10 and 5 percent are selected in 50 to 99 employment arbitration
cases per year. Employment neutrals, on average, mediate more cases than they arbitrate, where
21 percent mediated between 50 and 99 cases per year and an additional 6 percent mediated over
100 cases per year.
The labor arbitration caseload of multi-neutrals is similar to that of labor neutrals; however,
multi-neutrals are more likely to have robust labor mediation practices. Likewise, the employment
arbitration caseloads of multi-neutrals is similar to that of employment neutrals; however, multineutrals are less likely to have employment mediation caseloads of 50 or above relative to
employment neutrals. One take away from Table 8 is that multi-neutrals appear to be taking on the
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collective caseloads of labor neutrals and employment neutrals, presiding over similar counts of
labor cases as labor neutrals in addition to similar counts of employment cases as employment
neutrals.
8. Neutral Fees
What fees do neutrals charge for their services? I asked neutrals to record their standard fees
for their work as mediators and arbitrators in both labor and employment disputes. I asked for
hourly fees in employment disputes and daily fees in labor disputes reflecting the customary billing
practices of neutrals in the U.S. Relatedly, I asked neutrals whether they served as a mediator or
arbitrator in any dispute in which they did not charge any fees (i.e. they worked pro bono). Overall,
18 percent of neutrals responded they had worked pro bono in the past year. Broken down by
practice type, only 7 percent of labor neutrals, 29 percent of employment neutrals, and 21 percent
of multi-neutrals reported working pro bono at least once in the past year. Pro bono work is not
common in labor neutral practices and is relatively more common among those who practice
employment arbitration and mediation. This likely reflects the priority government agencies such
as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and court-annexed ADR systems given to
mediation which are not found in labor neutral practices.
Table 9a and 9b report the median and mean fees charged by practitioners for employment
and labor arbitration and mediation. The median and mean daily rates charged for labor arbitration
among labor neutrals are $1,600 and $1,543, respectively. Multi-neutrals charge slightly higher
daily fees for labor arbitration. This premium likely reflects the ability or willingness of multineutrals to pursue more lucrative employment arbitration and mediation cases. Interestingly, both
labor neutrals and multi-neutrals charge higher rates for mediation than arbitration. Employment
arbitration and mediation, when converted to a daily rate, command higher fees relative to labor
arbitration and mediation. Specifically, employment neutrals charge a median rate of $425 an hour
for employment arbitration work and $450 an hour for employment mediation work. Multineutrals charge comparable, but slightly lower hourly rates of $400 for employment arbitration
and $425 for employment mediation. The premium demanded by employment neutrals relative to
multi-neutrals is likely explained, at least in part, by the prevalence of legal practices among
employment neutrals, giving them the ability to anchor their arbitration and mediation fees to the
norms found for general legal services.
Table 9a: Median Fees, by Practice Type
Fees (median)
Type of Neutral Work
Employment Arbitration (hourly)
Employment Mediation (hourly)
Labor Arbitration (daily)
Labor Mediation (daily)
No.

Labor Neutral

--$ 1,600
$ 1,800
195

129

Employment
Neutral

$ 425
$ 450
--129

Multi-neutral

$ 400
$ 425
$ 1,800
$ 2,000
288

Table 9b: Mean Fees, by Practice Type
Fees (mean)
Type of Neutral Work
Employment Arbitration (hourly)
Employment Mediation (hourly)
Labor Arbitration (daily)
Labor Mediation (daily)
No.

Labor Neutral
--$ 1,543
$ 1,848
195

Employment
Neutral
$ 482
$ 499
--129

Multi-neutral
$ 431
$ 450
$ 1,941
$ 2,357
288

Fees charged by respondents vary across the different areas of neutral practice but also
around demographic and geographic characteristics. Shown in Table 10 below, I see that female
neutrals have higher median rates for employment arbitration and mediation than their male
counterparts. One potential explanation is that there is higher demand for female neutrals in the
employment arena due to the predominance of employment discrimination charges within that
field. This explanation would be consistent with the trend I observe in labor fees where the median
daily rate charged by females for labor arbitration and mediation is equal or lower to their male
counterparts. Another potential explanation is that women are more skilled in employment matters,
on average, than their male counterparts and, therefore, command higher wages. This trend is
unusual as there is a well-documented wage gap favoring males across industries and occupations
that is particularly stark among high-status professions. Further study is required to draw any
definitive conclusions about this issue.
Like gender, I may expect fees of minority neutrals to predictably lag behind those of their
white, non-Hispanic counterparts. This would be consistent with the overall pattern of wages
across the U.S. economy. However, I observe minorities charge equal fees for employment
arbitration services, lower fees for employment mediation services, higher fees for labor
arbitration, and lower fees for labor mediation relative to their white counterparts. Here again, the
pattern of neutral fees defies an easy explanation and does not map on to patterns seen in the U.S.
economy overall.
Surprisingly, the youngest cohort, those age 40 to 49, of neutrals also report the highest
fees for employment arbitration, employment mediation, and labor mediation. The highest rates
for labor arbitration are charged by those age 50 to 59, the second youngest cohort. Further, only
labor arbitration fees follow the normal life-cycle trend of wages raising with age, peaking, then
declining as the end of one’s career approaches. Indeed, I see the median daily fee for labor
arbitration is $1,800 for those in their 40s, raising to $1,950 for those in their 50s, then declining
from $1,800 for those in the 60s to $1,200 for the exceptional individuals working into their 90s.
The median fees charged in the remaining categories peak for those in their 40s, reach a nadir for
those in the 50s, then rise again and reach a general equilibrium for those in their 60s, 70s, and
80s.
I also present the median fees charged by full-time and part-time neutrals. Across case
types, full-time neutrals charge higher median rates than those working part-time. This is one area
where trends within the neutral profession are consistent with the trends in the broader U.S.
economy. Median fees are also generally higher for those with J.D.s relative to those with Ph.Ds.
This may reflect the higher fees charged by lawyers in the legal field relative to the fees
commanded by Ph.D.s within academia.
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Finally, Table 10 shows variation in median fees in different regions of the U.S. West Coast
neutrals charge the highest median fees across case types. Specifically, West Coast neutrals charge
$500 an hour in employment arbitration and mediation and a median daily fee of $1,850 for labor
arbitration and a striking $2,400 for labor mediation. Rates in the Midwest are the lowest among
all geographical regions. Specifically, neutrals practicing in the Midwest charge $350 an hour in
employment arbitration, $375 an hour in employment mediation, $1,500 a day for labor arbitration
and $1,600 a day for labor mediation.
Table 10: Median Fees, By Demographic Characteristics and Practice Type

No.

Employment Employment
Arbitration
Mediation

Labor
Arbitration

Labor
Mediation

Gender
Female
Male

119
487

$
$

450
400

$
$

450
418

$ 1,600
$ 1,600

$ 1,800
$ 2,000

Race
White
Non-White

584
28

$
$

400
400

$
$

450
400

$ 1,600
$ 1,750

$ 2,000
$ 1,800

Age
40 to 49
50 to 59
60 to 69
70 to 79
80 to 89
90 or over

18
36
200
277
68
8

$
$
$
$
$
--

525
388
400
400
350

$
$
$
$
$
--

500
350
450
450
450

$
$
$
$
$
$

$
$
$
$
$
--

Part-Time Status
Part-Time
255
Full-Time
357

$
$

375
450

$
$

375
450

$ 1,500
$ 1,800

$ 1,800
$ 2,000

Education
JD
PhD

$
$

400
375

$
$

450
450

$ 1,700
$ 1,400

$ 2,000
$ 1,550

450
385
375
450
500

$
$
$
$
$

$
$
$
$
$

490
76

Location
Northeast
237
$
450
$
Southeast
151
$
350
$
Midwest
205
$
350
$
Southwest
140
$
450
$
West
156
$
500
$
Note: Canadian wages are removed from this analysis
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1,800
1,950
1,800
1,600
1,500
1,200

1,800
1,600
1,500
1,625
1,850

2,400
1,900
2,000
2,000
2,000

2,000
2,000
1,600
2,000
2,400

IV.

EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION: VIEWS AND CONTROVERSIES

The appropriateness, growth, and effect of employment arbitration have been provocative
topics since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnston Lane Corp. In this
section, I report employment arbitration case characteristics and the opinions of neutrals on aspects
relating to the propriety of employment arbitration.
Scholars have been studying case outcomes in employment arbitration since its inception.
Early studies reported relatively high employee win rates and award amounts; however,
contemporary studies report bleaker outcomes for employee plaintiff win rates and award amounts
in arbitration relative to their litigating counterparts. Much of what I know about outcomes in
arbitration, however, comes from investigating cases from a single source: the American
Arbitration Association (AAA). But what can I say about the employment arbitration landscape
outside the AAA? And, of greater novelty, what can I say about neutrals’ own views of and
experiences with employment arbitration?
A. Neutral Perceptions of Employment Arbitration
As an entry point into neutral perceptions of employment arbitration, neutrals responded
to several opinion questions about the fairness and propriety of employment arbitration on a Likert
scale. Table 14 presents the mean and median responses to these questions. The Likert scale was
coded as follows: “Strongly Disagree,” coded as 0, “Disagree,” coded as 1, “Neither Agree Nor
Disagree,” coded as 2, “Agree,” coded as 3, and to “Strongly Agree,” coded as 4.
In addition to interpreting the simple mean or median response to each question, it is
informative to compare responses across neutral type. One stark, if not expected, finding is that
labor neutrals tend to have more negative perceptions of employment arbitration than employment
neutrals. However, multi-neutrals, neutrals who practice in both the labor and employment fields,
resemble neither employment nor labor neutrals; multi-neutrals consistently have their own
institutional characteristics. The largest differences between labor and employment neutrals appear
in their perceptions of extant arbitration providers, such as JAMS and the AAA. Labor neutrals
have more negative views that arbitration providers “adequately protect against the threat of
arbitrator bias,” “ensure adequate due process protections to all parties,” and “ensure every
arbitrator on their rosters is fully qualified and competent” relative to their employment and multineutral counterparts. These differences are statistically and practically significant.
Labor neutrals further are less likely than employment neutrals (and multi-neutrals) to
agree that “[employment arbitration] is an employee-friendly forum.” Indeed, the median response
for labor neutrals was “Somewhat Disagree” whereas the median response for employment and
multi-neutrals was “Neither Agree Nor Disagree.” Labor neutrals are also more likely to agree that
“[employment arbitration] is an employer-friendly forum” relative to employment and multineutrals. While I may expect neutrals practicing employment work to have more positive
perceptions of employment arbitration than those practicing labor work exclusively, it is
noteworthy that those who practice as employment or multi-neutrals are more likely to agree, on
average, that employment arbitration is an employer-friendly forum than an employee-friendly
forum. While there are no differences in the median responses, the mean response to “[employment
arbitration] is an employer-friendly forum” are 1.97 and 2.19 for employment and multi-neutrals,
respectively, but the average response to “[employment arbitration] is an employee-friendly
forum” are 1.69 and 1.56, respectively. These differences are statistically significant and show that
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even neutrals practicing in the employment arena view differences between the employee- and
employer-favorability of the employment arbitration forum.

B. Neutral Views on the Repeat Player Effect
An enduring chorus of critics charge employment arbitration, and employment arbitrators,
as inherently corruptible and susceptible to repeat player bias. The specter of the so-called “repeat
player bias” draws its essence from game theory: given that employer repeat players have the
prerogative to choose, or at least influence, who arbitrates a given case, arbitrators are feared to
have an incentive to betray their neutrality and issue favorable decisions to repeat players with
hopes that employers will select them to arbitrate future disputes.8 An employer’s ability to pick
an arbitrator, or at least an arbitrator provider, is furthered by their ability to unilaterally structure
the arbitration agreement in employer-promulgated agreements; this obviously gives employers a
distinct advantage over employees. By asking employment arbitrators themselves why repeat
employers fare better in arbitration than non-repeat employers, I hope to expand on the empirical
scholarship which simply identifies a repeat player effect (but cannot confidently explain why I
see it).
As an initial matter, I asked neutrals if they were familiar with the so-called “repeat player
effect.” As reported in Table 15 below, 64 percent of all respondents were familiar with the repeat
player effect, with employment and multi-neutrals having more familiarity than labor neutrals.
This finding is not unsurprising; the repeat player effect is a widely cited concern in public policy
debates and it is to be expected that neutrals who practice in the employment realm will be widely
informed of contemporary debates.

8

See generally, Bisom-Rapp, Susan, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in Employment
Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959-1049 (1999); Colvin, Alexander J.S., An Empirical
Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 123 (2011); Colvin, Alexander J.S. and Mark Gough, Individual Employment Rights Arbitration in the
United States: Actors and Outcomes, 68 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 1019-1042 (2015).
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Table 15: Awareness of Repeat Player Effect, by Practice Type
Labor Neutral
Employment Neutral
Multi-neutral
Total
Yes
53%
63%
71%
64%
No
47%
37%
29%
36%
Note: The exact question posed to respondents reads: “Have you heard of the so-called “repeat
player effect” in employment arbitration?
ˆFamiliarity with the repeat player effect should not be interpreted as neutral support for
its underlying premise. Indeed, I asked neutrals to offer heir qualitative responses to the following
prompt: “Repeat player effects” in employment arbitration relate to the statistical trend where
employers who appear before the same arbitrator on multiple occasions experience more favorable
outcomes than employees and employers who appear before an arbitrator only once. Some scholars
have (provocatively) interpreted this as evidence of arbitrator bias while others have cautioned
against this interpretation. In your view, what is being missed, overlooked, or ignored in current
discussions surrounding the "repeat player effect"?
Respondents who generally agreed that the repeat player effect was worthy of concern
offered comments along the following lines:
“Employers - not employees are repeat "customers." Therefore, they are more
familiar with "idiosyncrasies" of arbitrators. Advocates are for the most part judged
by those who hire them based on their success rate - win/loss record. Thus, if they
lose, they are more apt to avoid that arbitrator in the future”
“Repeat Player Effects are more likely in employment arbitration because the
arbitrator may consider it more likely that an employer will again retain the
arbitrator's services than will the employee/employee's representative.”
“Go figure, financial incentives are in play when a ‘neutral’ agrees to be paid to
adjudicate in a nonconsensual, unfair forum.”
Other respondents expressed skepticism toward repeat player effect concerns and offered
comments such as:
“Parties select arbitrators who can ensure a fair hearing. An arbitrator who often
rules for one side only on cases in which the facts don't support such a ruling will
not be very successful arbitrators.”
“At least in California, the Arbitrator is required to disclose the number of
arbitrations he/she has had with the parties and the parties then have an opportunity
to disqualify the Arbitrator if they believe he/she has had too many cases with one
party or another.”
“The fact that representatives who regularly appear before the same arbitrator learn
about the arbitrator's preferences in terms of how to run a proceeding and also may

134

understand better than a non-repeat player how to get the arbitrator to understand
her or his position.”
“Both lawyers who represent employees and lawyers who represent employers
maintain "books" on arbitrators and both must join in any appointment. Thus,
competent legal representation constitutes a practical safeguard against the
appointment of biased arbitrators.”
Others, still, offered assessments such as:
“To the extent the statistics are as stated, though I do not know this to be true, it is
more likely because employers have more information about arbitrators because
they are repeat players, where as plaintiff's lawyers are unlikely to be in the system
on a repetitive basis. To solve this problem more information should be available
to plaintiff's lawyers so that they can make equally informed arbitrator selection
decisions.”
“I have heard of the allegation but have no evidence that it actually occurs.”
“Sometimes, it is simply a matter that an arbitrator routinely finds that an employer
has been successful. Of course, there are arbitrators who are more management
biased or employee biased, but I believe that this is a minority.”
Neutral views on employment arbitration are varied; however, there are some clear takeaways
from neutral responses. First, neutrals can agree on a “repeat player effect” and disagree as to its
cause. Indeed, some arbitrators implicate otherwise benign, natural advantages inuring to repeat
clients while others identify corrupt or venial practitioners. Second, there is a clear need for greater
communication among neutrals themselves and between the neutral and scholarly community.
That at least some neutrals are unaware of the empirical findings giving rise to repeat player
concerns indicates the social scientists behind the research are not engaging with one of the key
stakeholders in this arena. Further, it appears not all neutrals agree on the existing protections and
regulations in place which may ameliorate repeat player effects.
C. Labor Arbitrator Interest in Employment Arbitration
Despite relatively negative sentiments concerning employment arbitration, on average,
there is a contingent of labor neutrals interested in becoming multi-neutrals by breaking into
employment neutral work. Table 16 presents labor neutral interest in starting to conduct
employment arbitration cases. Of the 193 labor neutrals who responded, only 35 percent, or 68
labor neutrals, expressed an interest in pursuing employment arbitration cases. Remember,
however, that a large proportion of the Academy is already engaged in employment neutral activity
and referred to throughout this report as multi-neutrals. Table 16 does not necessarily reflect the
views of Academy members as a whole but does show nontrivial interest from Academy members
who are currently practicing exclusively as labor neutrals.
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Table 16: Labor Neutral Interest in Employment Arbitration
Interest in Employment Arbitration
Yes
No
No.

No.
68
125
193

%
35
65
100

Labor neutrals who expressed interest in pursuing employment arbitration were asked to
identify any barriers to doing so. Table 17 shows that labor neutrals are open to employment
arbitration work but report high rates of general uncertainty surrounding breaking into the field.
Specifically, 68 percent of labor neutrals with an interest in employment arbitration report that
they do not know how to get parties to select them as neutrals in such cases. Likewise, 43 percent
of respondents reported “I have no idea how to break into the field.” Labor neutrals interested in
employment arbitration further expressed deficits in their knowledge of employment arbitration
hearings and employment law at relatively high rates. This implies the National Academy of
Arbitrators can support this subpopulation of their membership through offering broad,
introductory training and guidance.
Table 12: Perceived Barriers to Entry into Employment Arbitration Practice (Labor Neutrals Only)
Labor Neutral
(%)

Perceived Barrier
I do not know how to get parties to choose me as an employment arbitrator
I have no idea how to break into the field

68
43

I need more training in how employment arbitration hearings are conducted
I need more training in employment law before I can conduct employment
arbitration cases
There is too much pre-hearing motions or discovery practice
I am too busy to take on new types of cases
I need more training in litigation practices, such as discovery and motion
practice, before I can conduct employment arbitration cases
There is too much travel involved in employment arbtiration
No.
Note: Responses do not sum to 100 percent as multiple selections were soliticted.

28
21
21
15
15
2
68

D. Employment Arbitration Practices
How are employment arbitrators appointed? Our results, reported in Table 18, indicate that
the AAA roster is the most common source of appointment as an employment arbitrator, with
almost two-thirds (62%) of appointments coming through the AAA roster. While the AAA is also
the most frequent source of appointments for NAA members practicing employment arbitration,
they also receive more direct appointments (38% v. 20% for non-NAA members). This may be
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due to the reputational strength of NAA members who are often well known to advocates from
their past work.
Table 18: Methods of Appointment in Employment Arbitration
Employment Neutral (%)

Multi-neutral (%)

Type of Appointment
Direct Appointment

20

38

Standing Panel

3

5

AAA Roster

62

45

JAMS Roster

9

1

Court Referral

2

1

Other

4

9

Within the general domain of employment arbitration, there is a range of different types
of cases. As indicated in Table 19, the most common type of cases is those deriving from
mandatory, employer promulgated procedures. These comprise over half of the employment
arbitration caseload for both employment arbitrators (70%) and NAA members (61%) who
practice employment arbitration. The other substantial category of cases is those brought under
individually-negotiated agreements, typically involving higher paid executives. About a fifth of
all cases fall in this category. Relatively few employment arbitration cases are brought under
post-dispute or voluntary agreements, only 3% of cases for non-NAA members in this category.
This result supports arguments suggesting that post-dispute arbitration agreements are relatively
rare and procedures that make arbitration a voluntary post-dispute decision will be infrequently
used.
Table 19: Type of Employment Arbitration Clause, by Practice Type
Employment Neutral
(%)
Type of Arbitration Clause
Mandatory (Employer-Promulgated)
Individually Negotiated Agreements
Post-Dispute/Voluntary
FINRA
Other

70
19
3
4
2
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Multi-neutral (%)

61
20
8
3
8

V.

DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Our findings provide a picture of the developing employment arbitration profession and
how it is similar to but also different from labor arbitration, as embodied in its leading professional
organization, the National Academy of Arbitrators. One of the most striking findings is the
prevalence of multi-neutrals, practitioners engaged in both labor and employment arbitration
and/or mediation. Of the 612 neutrals surveyed, almost half, or 47 percent, reported practicing
within both domains. Categorizing neutrals into the binary categories of “labor” and
“employment” appears to be untenable and glosses over the nuance that is found within the
profession.
Regarding the basic demographics of the profession, employment neutrals and multineutrals are slightly more diverse than labor neutrals in terms of gender; however across all types
the large majority of neutrals are white, non-Hispanic males. If the profession is to be more
representative of the population of employees who appear before it, then it is important that efforts
be made to encourage greater diversity in the ranks across practice types. In the area of professional
backgrounds, the results indicate employment neutrals are two to three times more to have worked
or be currently engaged in legal careers representing employers relative to legal careers
representing employees or unions. This is not so for labor or multi-neutrals. It may well be that
many of these neutrals are able to put aside their past or alternative career orientation on the
employer side when they engage in their neutral work, but it is a concern that employer-side
backgrounds are two to three times as prevalent as employee-side backgrounds in the employment
neutral profession. If employment arbitration is to be viewed as a neutral profession, then it is
important that greater efforts be made to achieve balanced representation from both sides of the
employment relationship. These concerns are amplified when you consider that a majority, 58
percent, of part-time employment neutral income is derived from their legal work.
A surprising finding is that among the employment neutrals surveyed, only 31 percent of
consider themselves full-time mediators and arbitrators. This suggests that the volume of
employment arbitration and mediation work may not be sufficient to provide for full caseloads for
many practitioners, particularly given the prevalence of multi-neutrals. As yet, employment
arbitration has not provided the type of caseloads supporting a cadre of full-time professional
neutrals to the same degree as has labor arbitration. For getting access to cases, our results also
indicate that the AAA roster is the key source for employment neutrals, indicating the importance
of that organization to the emerging profession.
There are intensive debates about due process and fairness in employment arbitration. Our
results provide some support for both sides of these debates. I find limited evidence that labor
neutrals, employment neutrals, or multi-neutrals, on the whole have substantial concerns about all
aspects of due process or the organizations governing the cases employment arbitrators decide.
However, I do find labor arbitrators are most likely to be concerned about the fairness of
employment arbitration and that even those who practice employment arbitration – both
employment neutrals and multi-neutrals--are more likely to agree, on average, that employment
arbitration is an employer-friendly forum than an employee-friendly forum. This suggests there is
room for institutional reforms and safeguards to ensure the long-term viability and fairness of this
area of neutral practice.
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